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Where sexual relations are concerned, our communication often fails to adhere to the highest 
standards of honesty and integrity.
2
  Prowess and status may be exaggerated, false 
expressions of emotion made, and commitments undertaken without full sincerity. We 
tolerate many kinds of misleading acts, aimed at securing sexual consent.  But not all 
deceptive procurement of sexual consent is innocent.  For example, impersonation of a 
person’s spouse or partner by way of procuring sex is both morally wrong and legally 
prohibited. 
It is important to note that some, perhaps a great deal, of deceptive communication, in the 
context of sexual relations, may make no difference to the decision to consent.  In other 
situations deception conceals a fact—a "dealbreaker"—such that were the victim to have 
known of that fact she would not have consented.  Tom Dougherty has argued that whenever 
one party S deceives another party R into sex, by concealing a dealbreaker, the normative 
situation is the same as there being no morally valid consent at all for that act, by that 
person.
3
 As such, deception into sex wrongs the victim in the same way as sex with the 
victim whilst comatose.
4
  Importantly, he argues that this is the case even if the deception is 
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about what may seem to be a trivial or minor matter such as income or educational history. 
Dougherty thus sets himself against orthodox intuitions about sexual consent.  Such 
orthodoxy is committed to the Lenient Thesis: 'It is only a minor wrong to deceive another 
person into sex by misleading her or him about certain personal features such as natural hair 
color, occupation, or romantic intentions' (718). 
Some clarifications are needed here.  First, if our view of the ethics of deception is that 
deception is never a minor wrong, then we might reject the Lenient Thesis as stated but still 
agree with the widespread view that deception about one's taste in pets, the context of sexual 
consent, wrongs the duped party less than complete concealment of the performance of a 
sexual act.  The Lenient Thesis is meant to articulate a widespread view that deceiving about 
different kinds of things, such that the 'dupe' is deceived into sex, involves varying degrees of 
wronging.  As Dougherty puts it 'most people think that the wrongness depends on the type of 
deception involved. Impersonating someone’s spouse is seriously wrong but not so with run-
of-the-mill falsehoods like "I’m not fussed about mess"' (718).  Dougherty's view is that 
deceiving someone into sex by lying about, or concealing, one's pet preferences wrongs the 
duped party in the same way that sex with them whilst comatose would (721), for, in each 
case, in Dougherty's view, there is no morally valid consent to sex. 
 
The Lenient Thesis can be interpreted in different ways.  On one reading—an objective 
reading—the Lenient Thesis reflects the view that there is: (a) a class of facts A, such that 
deception into sex that induces false beliefs about members of A does seriously wrong the 
victim (e.g., A would include facts about identity, or about one's performing a sexual act in 
place of a medical examination); (b) a second class of facts B, such that deception about these 
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distinctions to be drawn within all these classes of deceptively procured consent. 
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facts may wrong the dupe, but not in the way that deception about members of A does.  We 
shall see below that Dougherty assumes that what 'most people think' is this objective variant 
(see the section below dealing with the distinction between core and peripheral aspects of the 
sexual act).  But this is not the only way of articulating our intuitions about leniency.  For 
example, we might plausibly reject the idea that there is a normative difference between the 
two objective classes of facts A and B as noted above, whilst holding that in the main people 
will tend to care more about some things rather than others.  On this "subjective" variant of 
the Lenient Thesis deception about pet preferences, or which school one attended, is less apt 
to invalidate consent because—and we shall expand on this below—such facts, for most 
people, will tend to be less important.   
 
However we interpret the Lenient Thesis, Dougherty’s arguments entail that there is much 
more nonconsensual sex than we currently think (even if there are methodological problems 
in determining just how much more.  On his expansionist account of the deceptive 
undermining of consent, many of us have been, or will be, guilty of wronging others in an 
extremely serious way: in fact, in just the  same way that we would were we  to have sex with 
someone whilst comatose. Similarly, many more of us than we ordinarily think will be (or 
have been) seriously wronged by others.  If this expansionist theory of is correct, then further 
questions arise about the extent to which, and the ways in which, we ought to revise our 
sexual mores, and, if necessary, our laws about fraudulently procured sex.   
 
There would be little problem if his expansionist conclusion were clearly unsupported.  But 
Dougherty has a number of interconnected, well-developed and plausible arguments, both 
positive (in favour of his expansion of serious wrongings) and negative (against alternative 
theories of deceptive undermining of consent that are consistent with the Lenient Thesis).  A 
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false, but seemingly plausible, theory that provides grounds for (mistakenly) accusing 
countless people of serious wrongdoing is not a good thing to have accepted as common 
knowledge.  Although Dougherty's arguments are plausible, they are not sound: we should 
not think about the deceptive undermining of sexual consent in the way that the expansionist 
account demands. 
Because Dougherty's arguments are complex and multi-faceted, it will take a little time to 
unpack what is going on, and to show where things goes wrong.  The shape of the discussion 
is this.  In the first section we introduce a theory of the deceptive undermining of consent—
the "gradable voluntariness theory"—that is consistent with, and lends indirect support to, the 
Lenient Thesis.  Section two examines Dougherty's three lines of argument against this 
theory and finds them wanting, particularly because he fails to acknowledge that 
'dealbreakers' can be stronger or weaker (and we shall explain what we mean by this below).  
Sections three and four critically examine two positive lines of argument that Dougherty 
offers (lines of argument that have a degree of independence from the negative arguments 
discussed in section two).  But each of these positive lines of argument is problematic.  Our 
conclusion will be that Dougherty's arguments against the Lenient Thesis fail (his negative 
arguments leave the "subjective" variant standing, whilst the flaws in his positive arguments 
leave both the "subjective" and "objective" variants untouched.   
1.  The 'gradable voluntariness' theory 
The Lenient Thesis receives support from extant theorizing about the ethics of deception into 
sex.  Many theorists of sexual consent advocate variants of what Dougherty calls the 
gradable voluntariness theory of how deception undermines consent: if deception leads a 
person to make a consent decision that they would not have done, then, in some 
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circumstances such deception invalidates the consent so given.
5
  The starting point for this 
theory is the recognition  that voluntariness is a necessary condition for valid consent.  An act 
of consent is morally efficacious (valid) only if it is properly voluntary.  An act of consent 
procured at gunpoint is not valid and the normative situation is not changed in the way that  it 
is by a valid act of consent.  Just as coercion can restrict or impinge upon voluntariness, so 
too can deception.  Joan McGregor, for example, suggests that 'deception or fraud, similarly 
to coercion, affects the voluntariness of an agent's action' adding that it thus 'undermin[es] the 
legitimacy of consent'.
6
   
It is important to note that the gradable voluntariness theory recognises that deception can 
influence another's decision to a greater or lesser degree.  As Feinberg puts it, there is 'a 
spectrum of voluntariness, [ . . .], corresponding to variations in the fraudulently produced 
inducement to consent, just as there seems to be a spectrum of voluntariness corresponding to 
degrees of coercive pressure'.
7
 Coercion lies at one end of a continuum of degrees of (undue) 
influence.  In a similar way, the gradable voluntariness account can hold that deception can 
impinge upon an agent's decision-making to a greater or lesser degree.  As Archard puts it, a 
person who is deceived into sex 'is  wronged to the extent that her will is not implicated in the 
[sexual] act and it does not express her free choices'.
8
   
The gradable voluntariness theory takes into account the fact that some kinds of deception 
may merely tip the balance in favour of deciding to consent.  Where deception tips the 
balance the relevant counterfactual—if R were to know that p she would not consent—is true, 
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but the counterfactual is only made true by a relatively small set of very close possible 
worlds.  Suppose  R wouldn’t want to have sex with older men.  S, aware of this, dyes his 
hair to appear younger.  Suppose R finds S attractive, witty, sexy.  R willingly has sex with S.  
There are some close possible worlds where R knows the facts about S’s age and does not 
consent.  But there are also close possible worlds where R knows the facts and does consent 
(she might, for example, revise her extant preferences in light of new information "Who 
knew? Not all old guys are monsters!").   
But deception can also lead the consentor to make a "never in a million years" type of 
decision.  Suppose S deceives a devoutly religious R—who would rather die than have sex 
with a person outside her religion—into having sex, by lying about his religion.  Even if R 
has other reasons for consenting to sex with R, there are no close possible worlds where R 
knows the truth about S’s religion and R consents.  In this example, unlike the one above, we 
have a fantastically strong deal breaker.  
The gradable voluntariness theory differs from Dougherty's theory in the following way: 
Dougherty argues that whenever someone is deceived into consenting to sex the consent is 
morally invalid.  The gradable voluntariness theory, by way of contrast, armed with a 
distinction between weak and strong deal-breakers holds that not all deception into consent to 
sex invalidates the consent so given.  On the theory favoured by Archard, just as coercion lies 
at one end of a continuum of influence, and undermines voluntariness, not all deception into 
sex undermines voluntariness to such a degree that the normative force of consent is 
undermined.  Clearly there is a challenge here to identity the proper threshold—to specify 
how strong a dealbreaker needs to be to undermine the force of consent—but an analogous 
problem arises for the coercive undermining of consent too.   
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For our purposes, what matters is that the gradable voluntariness theory offers an indirect line 
of support for the Lenient Thesis.  We say "indirect" because, as we shall see in a moment, 
the gradable voluntariness does not imply that there is some special class of facts—e.g., facts 
about hair color, or occupation—such that deception about those facts does not invalidate 
consent whilst deception about other facts (about identity or religious faith, say) does 
invalidate consent.  The gradable voluntariness theory holds that not all deception into 
consent invalidates consent.  Only those deceptions that misdirect a consentor's decision to a 
particularly high degree do so: those that involve strong dealbreakers.  However, it is not 
implausible to assume that for many, perhaps most, people facts about hair color or 
occupation are ones which are weighed up in the balance (that is, they will tend to feature in 
'weak' dealbreakers) whilst facts about identity will tend to involve strong dealbreakers.  If 
this assumption is correct then the graded voluntariness theory can explain why the Lenient 
Thesis holds.  
There is scope here, of course, for disagreement about what our current intuitions to with 
'leniency' actually are.  We might reject Dougherty's Lenient Thesis, but argue that our 
intuitions about leniency in the domain of sexual consent are underpinned by something 
similar to, but not identical to, Dougherty's version.  We might, for example, have some kind 
of qualified variant of the Lenient Thesis which holds that in the main deception about hair 
color does not invalidate consent (because, in the main  it involves weak dealbreakers), whilst 
allowing that such deception may do so in some contexts (if, for that  agent facts about hair 
color are a strong dealbreaker).  This qualified version of the Lenient Thesis is distinct from 
Dougherty's own position because Dougherty's position does not allow for, or acknowledge, a 
distinction within the class of dealbreakers between strong and weak.   
In sum, the gradable voluntariness theory accepts a distinction between strong and weak 
dealbreakers and, as such, it opens up the conceptual space to allow that some instances of 
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deceiving into sex invalidate consent whilst others do not, which, in turn, offers an 
explanation of and support for a subjective variant of the Lenient Thesis.  This kind of 
gradable view of the normative implications of deceiving into consent to sex is not open to 
Dougherty for whom any deception-by-dealbreaker invalidates consent.   
 
2.  Three arguments against the gradable voluntariness theory (and why they fail) 
Dougherty has three lines of argument against the gradable voluntariness approach.  First, he 
argues that it is internally inconsistent. Archard, a proponent of the gradable approach, notes 
that morally valid consent does not require the consentor to know everything about a sexual 
act or the agent performing it.  For example, suppose S has 140g of potassium in his body; R 
can consent to sex with a person with 140g in their body without knowing that this is so.  So 
what information does the consentor need to know?  Archard suggests: 'only everything that 
would make a real difference to whether or not she consented'.
9
 Dougherty then objects: 
This claim is in tension with the gradable voluntariness approach since the claim 
implies that all forms of deceiving someone into sex are nonconsensual. This is because 
ignorance of any deal-breaker makes 'a real difference to whether or not' one consents. 
So if false proclamations of love lead to someone being deceived into sex, then she 
does not validly consent. Her will is opposed to the encounter, given it is an encounter 
with someone who does not love her, and this is enough to make it the case that she 
does not validly consent. (728) 
 
But this line of objection fails to distinguish two different lines of contrast.  First, there is a 
contrast between irrelevant and relevant information.  Second, once we are within the class of 
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relevant information, any particular piece of information may make more or less of a 
difference, in that context, to R's decision.  Consider the analogy with coercion.  Suppose we 
ask: what kinds of things influence others?  This would be a question about the 'entry 
condition' for influence.  Things that fall outside this are of no influence at all.  Then within 
the class of things that influence others there are grades of influence and, importantly, grades 
of undue influence with coercion at one end of the scale.  Just because there is a binary 
contrast between relevance and irrelevance, does not imply that that there is no further 
normatively significant scalar contrast within the class of relevant items. 
Dougherty has a second line of argument against the Lenient Thesis: 
the Lenient Thesis can only plausibly be based on a(n) [ . . .] account of consent that 
makes a fundamental distinction between different features of a sexual encounter  On 
this view, someone does not validly consent to a sexual encounter when deceived about 
its 'core' features, such as the interaction’s not being a genuine medical procedure or the 
other person’s not being one’s usual romantic partner. When someone is misled about 
these core features, then her will is not sufficiently implicated in the act for it to be 
consensual.  Someone may validly consent even when misled about the encounter’s 
peripheral features, such as the other person’s natural hair color, occupation, or 
romantic intentions. (728) 
 
But Dougherty is mistaken to claim that the Lenient Thesis can only be based upon this kind 
of distinction.  This is not what the gradable voluntariness theory is committed to, and, as we 
have seen, the gradable theory is consistent with the subjective variant of the Lenient Thesis.  
Whether or not some fact is a strong or weak dealbreaker for the consentor is a subjective 
matter in that is a function of the particular agent's preference set.  Dougherty argues that the 
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gradable theorist cannot draw upon this kind of subjective criterion of what matters whilst at 
the same time, endorsing the Lenient Thesis.   
But if we take this line, then we should conclude that someone does not consent to sex 
when she is deceived into sex. For, by my stipulative definition, someone is deceived 
into sex when she forms a false belief about a deal breaker: the deception conceals a 
feature of the sexual encounter that makes a decisive difference to the victim’s decision 
to have sex. (731) 
 
But this just returns us to the mistake above: Dougherty does not seem to recognise, or allow, 
that dealbreakers themselves vary from weak to strong.  In our "older man" example above, 
we have a weak dealbreaker (we don't have to "travel" far to find a possible world where R 
does know and consents); in the "religion" example we have a strong dealbreaker (only in 
very distant possible worlds does R know the facts about S's religion and consent to sex).  
Dougherty then suggests: 
to resist my claim that someone fails to consent whenever she is deceived into sex, 
someone would have to find a different way of drawing the distinction between 
subjectively core and peripheral features. I am doubtful that anyone could find a 
systematic way of drawing the distinction, let alone that she could adequately motivate 
this way of doing so. (732) 
 
But this is exactly what the gradable voluntariness theory does provide, and in a way that 
mirrors issues about how coercion (in contrast to other kinds of influence) undermines 
consent.  It will not seem to do so if we fail to recognise or acknowledge that misdirection 
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comes in degrees, or if we ignore the fact that there is, in addition to the binary 
'relevance/irrelevance' distinction,  a distinction to be drawn amongst degrees of relevance.   
We might conclude our response to Dougherty here: the gradable voluntariness theory is 
consistent with the subjective variant of the Lenient Thesis, and thus allows us to see why we 
might find it intuitive, but Dougherty gives us no good reason to reject the gradable 
voluntariness theory.  But to stop here would be a mistake: for Dougherty has other positive 
lines of argument in favour of his expansionist conclusion.
10
   
3.  Scope-based argument 1: the intentions thesis 
The gradable voluntariness theory focuses on the normative significance of unduly restricting 
or impinging upon the voluntariness of a decision to consent.  But this is not the only way 
that a consent transaction can be "deficient" normatively speaking.  Suppose R leaves a note 
in her kitchen addressed to her room-mate "Dear T, feel free to take my canoe this weekend."  
If some other party, S, secretly takes the canoe, S acts without R's consent.  But the reason 
why S has no permission to act is not because S has impinged upon the voluntariness of R's 
decision to consent, S wrongs R here simply because S's act falls outside the normative scope 
of R's consent.  Now suppose that S wants to use R's canoe, but believes that R will not lend 
it to him.  S then impersonates R's canoeing partner T and asks "May I take the canoe?"  R's 
reply "of course" is intended to permit T, not S to take the canoe.  The consent that was 
given, did not permit S to take the canoe.  There are examples of this kind involving consent 
to sex.  Suppose S enters R’s home late at night, and deceives R into thinking he is her 
husband T. She "consents" to sexual intercourse.  Here R's consent is directed at some other 
agent, so, in effect, S acts without consent.  The point is that there is no valid consent for that 
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agent to do what he did (there would have been consent for T to have sex with R had T been 
the person present rather than S).  This is a scope-based explanation of the deceptive 
undermining of consent. 
A scope-based account of the deceptive undermining of consent is at the root of Dougherty's 
expansionist argument.  In fact, there are two lines of argument here: one rests upon a 
substantive (but flawed) theory of the normative scope of consent, plus a second one (also 
flawed) that does not.  We will consider each in turn.   
The 'substantive' argument begins with an appeal to the Intentions Thesis: 'The rights that we 
waive are the rights that we intend to waive' (736).  This is plausible.  However, it is not the 
Intentions Thesis verbatim that does the work against the Lenient Thesis, but, rather, a more 
specific assumption about the way that the consentor's intentions fix the normative scope of 
consent.  Dougherty correctly claims: 
In consenting, we intend to allow a restricted range of possibilities, where these 
restrictions are both implicit and explicit. Any actual interaction with our persons or 
property is consensual only if this interaction falls within this restricted range of 
permitted possibilities.'  (736) 
 
Dougherty then adds something that has the ring of truth, but on closer inspection is less 
clear:  
On this account of consent, if we object to events in virtue of any feature of them, then 




One interpretation of this is framed with indicative conditionals: if we object to S doing X, 
then we do not intend to permit S to do X by our consent.  This claim is not true.  We can, of 
course, object to some feature of S's doing X, but, all things considered, still consent to it.  
For example, R may very much object to her boorish boss, and not at all want the boss to 
enter her home, but, for a wide range of other reasons she still decides to permit her boss to 
enter her home.  However, Dougherty makes a second assumption about consent framed in 
terms of knowledge-involving counterfactual conditionals: 'were we aware of any of the 
features of the event, we would have to still be happy to go along with it' (emphasis added, 
736).   
However, contra Dougherty, such a counterfactual cannot be a necessary condition for valid 
consent.  There is nothing incoherent about the idea of valid consent that we regret with the 
benefit of hindsight (and hindsight is simply a temporally delayed parallel to the 
counterfactuals cited above).  In such cases our consent does render others' actions 
permissible even though we would not have consented had we known of the relevant fact.  
For example, suppose R is happy to have casual sex with many people but she also has a 
romantic ideal that when she meets "the one" she will have a long courtship, rather than 
"jumping into bed".  At a party R has casual sex with S judging him, at that moment to be 
"film-star handsome, but probably shallow, good for a one-night stand".  After some more 
dates, however, she comes to recognise that S has the traits that make him a very good 
candidate for being "the one". Had she known that he had these traits she would not have 
consented on that occasion; she would have "saved it for later".  She regrets consenting when 
she did.  However, if Dougherty's theory is correct  then S wrongs R in the same way he 
would were he to have sex with her whilst she was unwilling and comatose—though 
blamelessly—and this is because R would not have consented on that occasion, had she 
14 
 
known these facts about S.
11
  It is no good for Dougherty to reply that these examples are 
about kinds of fact that are nothing to do with the sexual encounter (and, as such, can be of 
no relevance to determining the scope of consent): Dougherty claims that ignorance of facts 
about an agent's age, income, education, or about ' one’s attitudes toward pets, or even how 
funny one finds the other person' (719) can invalidate consent, so facts about S's personal 
traits of character readily fall within the scope of his account.  
Dougherty argues that this way of thinking about the normative scope of consent—that the 
scope  of what we permit by our consent to is fixed, in part, by what we would consent to 
with full relevant knowledge—is grounded in the idea that the normative force of sexual 
consent is importantly bound up with the significance of autonomy.  But most (modern, 
liberal) theorists of sexual consent agree about the normative significance of our sexual 
choices without endorsing the expansionist conclusion.  Sexual consent operates against a 
backdrop of first-order claim rights against certain kinds of bodily touching by others. In 
liberal sexual ethics individuals possess a distinctive kind of discretionary normative power 
to create exceptions to those rights.  It is up to R whether to consent, and to whom to give 
consent, and for what.  R may decide on a whim, or for reasons that others find foolish.  The 
discretionary power to permit is protected by further normative elements, including 
obligations upon other parties to refrain from interfering in the exercise of that power.  
Framed thus, this kind of radically discretionary individual power underpins a distinctive and 
significant kind of individual 'sovereignty' and control in our sexual relationships with others.  
Dougherty's appeal to knowledge-involving counterfactuals about what we would consent to 
were we to have full knowledge is a reflection of his commitment to something that goes way 
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beyond the recognition of the fact that valid consent must be properly voluntary.  Dougherty 
seems to favour some kind of "ideal autonomy" conception of the power to permit by 
consent, one that holds that we permit only those things that we would choose to permit were 
we to be appraised of all relevant facts.  The fact that consent decisions are ours to make, and 
that others ought not to unduly influence them, does not entail that we do not permit S to do 
X if we would not consent were we to be appraised of all the facts about that action or the 
agent performing it.  Dougherty does not provide any argument for this kind of 'ideal 
autonomy' grounding of the power to permit by consent and, with a more modest and 
plausible conception of what is involved in possessing a discretionary normative power, the 
expansionist argument is unsupported.   
4.  Scope-based argument 2: analogy and extension 
Suppose we reject Dougherty's theory of the normative scope of consent.  He could still argue 
that examples of seemingly "minor" deception are structurally analogous to examples like 
that of impersonation and, as such, if we accept that partner impersonation invalidates 
consent so too will, say, deception about character traits or educational background.  In 
partner impersonation consent is directed at—and only at—one particular individual, but 
another individual performs the act.  But acts of consent are not merely directed at individual 
agents, they can be directed at types of action, and actions, like agents, can be concealed.  For 
example, suppose S is a male gynaecologist. S tells patient R that he needs to perform an 
internal examination by inserting a speculum.  R consents to the examination. With R’s 
viewpoint blocked by a screen, S inserts his penis.
12
  Here consent is given to a type of act, 
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but another type of act is performed.
13
  Here it does not matter whether R would have 
consented with ideal knowledge, the point is that she didn't consent to that.  These two 
examples reflect two broader schemata for normatively deficient consent transactions: 
(i) PARTICULAR AGENT:  R consents (only)  to S doing F, but T does F  
(ii) TYPE OF ACT: R consents (only)  to S doing F but S does G. 
Now consider the supposedly 'minor' dealbreaker cases, such as deception about one's 
educational history.  This seems to involve a third schema, a variant upon the first two: 
(iii) TYPE OF AGENT:  R consents (only) to an agent of type X doing F, but an agent who is 
not X does F. 
As an example of (iii),  suppose R consents to surgery; she does not specify which surgeon 
will perform the act, but her consent is restricted in scope to appropriate medical personnel: 
agents of a certain type.  If an unqualified anaesthetist "has a go" at surgery whilst R is 
unconscious, R is wronged, because consent was only directed at agents of a certain type, so 
no permission is given to agents who are not of that requisite type.  But if we allow that 
transactions of type (iii) involve no permission for the act that is performed (by that agent) we 
seem to have reached Dougherty's expansionist conclusion.  Here are two further instances of 
(iii): 
(iii a) R consents (only) to a person who went to Harvard touching her body, but an agent 
who did not go to Harvard does so. 
(iii b) R consents (only) to a person who is rich touching her body, but an agent who is not 
rich does so. 
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 Elsewhere 'Why Deception Does not Undermine Consent' (under review) I discuss why and when this kind of 
deceptive strategy arises and the importance of the concealed act being evidentially similar to the type of act for 
which consent is sought.  
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The line of argument developed above presupposes that schema (iii) has an application in the 
case of everyday sexual consent.  But sexual consent is, typically, unlike consent to surgery: 
it is not directed at types of agent, it is directed at a unique particular agent.  As a simple test, 
we need only consider whether any agent, other than the one who did the act would have 
been permitted to act.  In the 'surgery' case the answer is yes: another surgeon could have 
acted permissibly, because the consent was directed at any member of a set.  But when R 
consents to sex with S on the assumption that S went to Harvard, consent is certainly not 
directed at any person who went to Harvard.  Consent directed at a particular person is not 
simply a narrower version—a limit case—of consent directed at anyone of a certain type.   
Consider a simple non-sexual example: R has some good quality old winter clothes to dispose 
of.  She puts up a sign saying "Free clothes for the homeless" in her yard.  Suppose S is not 
homeless, but takes the clothes.  This is an instance of schema (iii) above:  S wrongs R, as R's 
consent was directed at a type of person and S is not of that type.  But now suppose R often 
sees S late at night wandering the streets looking unkempt and underdressed for the weather.  
She learns that S is called Bob.  Assuming him to be homeless, she leaves a package of 
clothes out in the street clearly labelled "Bob, these are for you, help yourself".  Bob is not 
homeless.  He is a well paid professor of logic whose attentions are focused on matters other 
than his appearance.  Bob sees the note and being poor at reading people's intentions can't 
work out why he is being offered clothes, but there is a clear message that they are for him, 
so he takes them.
14
  Here R consents to S's taking the clothes on the assumption that S is 
homeless (and it is not directed at any member of a set).  The consent is directed at a 
particular agent, but based upon a false assumption about his properties.  It is not the case, in 
this example, that Bob wrongs R, or that R's consent is invalid.  This is true even though R's 
consent was made on a false assumption and she would not have left the clothes for him had 
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 Note that on the 'ideal autonomy' theory, Bob wrongs R in the same way that he would were he to have stolen 
them because R would not intend to give Bob the clothes had she known he was a well-paid logician. 
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she known he was a well-paid logician.  On Dougherty's account of the normative scope of 
consent, by way of contrast, Bob does wrong R and there is no consent for his taking the 
clothes.  This is because Dougherty's account does not acknowledge the difference between  
(i) intending to permit S to do X on the (false) assumption that S is F;  
and 
 (ii) intending to permit anyone who is F (but only those who are F) to do X.   
On Dougherty's account R does not intend to permit a non-homeless person to take the 
clothes, and, as such, the fact that Bob is not homeless implies that no valid consent was 
given for him to do so.  In short, the fact that there are instances where consent fails to permit 
another's actions for 'scope-based' reasons (as in our three schemata above) does not imply 
that the Lenient Thesis is false.  This is because sexual consent is directed at particular 
individuals based upon assumptions that we make about their features it is (typically) not 
directed at members of a set who have those features.   
5.  Conclusion 
The aim here has been to resist a certain kind of 'expansionist' account of deceptive wronging 
in sexual consent, one that would vastly increase the amount of (and the moral seriousness of) 
a great deal of deception in the context of (what seem to be) consensual sexual relations.  
First, Dougherty's arguments against the "gradable voluntariness" account fail—especially 
because of a failure to recognise or acknowledge that dealbreakers themselves can be 
"graded".  Although the gradable voluntariness theory does not directly entail the Lenient 
Thesis, it does lend support to certain variants of it.  The gradable voluntariness theory does 
not imply an objective distinction between "peripheral" and "core" features of a sexual act—
where deception about the "peripheral" features leaves consent valid, whilst deception about 
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"core"' features does not.  A subjective variant of the Lenient Thesis can be viewed as holding 
that certain kinds of fact will tend to be of less deliberative importance than others.  When 
this line of thought is combined with the line of argument that only deception involving 
strong dealbreakers invalidates consent we have both an explanation of, and a limited 
justification of the Lenient Thesis.  The justification is a limited one because on this line of 
argument if some fact is a strong dealbreaker for the consentor, then, in principle, consent 
may be invalidated (if the degree of undue influence upon the consentor's decision is above a 
certain threshold.  Dougherty's theory does not allow for any distinction within the class of 
dealbreakers, so, on his account, any dealbreaker no matter how weak, counterfactually 
speaking, invalidates consent.   
We then identified a further 'driver' of expansion in Dougherty's view that the normative 
scope of consent is fixed by what the consentor would consent to, given ideal knowledge 
about the agent and act.  This 'ideal autonomy' theory was without support.  We then saw that 
we can argue for the expansionist conclusion without a commitment to a theory of the scope 
of consent grounded in ideal autonomy theory.  In some contexts, ignorance of a person's 
traits can undermine consent in the same way that consent is undermined in the 
impersonation case.  A person who consents to being operated on by a surgeon (and only a 
surgeon) is wronged if a non-surgeon does so: no consent was given for a person of that kind 
to the act.  But there are important differences between giving permission to a particular 
individual on the assumption that they are G, and directing one's consent at anyone who is G.  
If we fail to keep apart permitting an individual and permitting a type of person, to do X, then 
we risk collapsing the kind of normative failing we find in cases of partner impersonation 
(where consent is directed at a unique individual and not at the person who performs the act), 
and cases where the consentor would not have consented had she known of some fact about 
the other agent.   
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In sum, then, the expansionist conclusion proposed by Dougherty is not justified by the 
arguments that Dougherty offers.  Dougherty's negative arguments, targeting the gradable 
voluntariness theory, leave the "subjective" variant of the Lenient Thesis standing.  
Dougherty's positive arguments, insofar as they rest upon an overly strong conception of 
autonomy, and upon a lack of clarity about the distinction between permitting an individual 
to do a type of act and permitting a type of individual to do it, leave both the "subjective" and 
"objective" variants of the Lenient Thesis standing.  However, we have not shown here that a  
rejection of the Lenient Thesis might not be justified by some other line of argument.
15
  A 
revision to our intuitions about the range of, and seriousness of, wrongings attendant upon 
deceiving into sex may be justified, but further work needs to be done to show conclusively 
that this is the case.  The aim here has been more modest—and largely negative—to show 
that we should not think about the deceptive undermining of consent in the way that 
Dougherty suggests. 
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Relatedly, although we have defended the 'gradable voluntariness' theory from Dougherty's objections to it we 
have not shown that it is an adequate account of how deception undermines the normative force of consent.  
Elsewhere I offer an account of the normative implications of deception for certain kinds of consent transaction 
(more specifically, examples of partner impersonation or of performing a sexual act in the guise of a medical 
examination).  This account overlaps with Dougherty's to some extent, in that the explanation of the wronging in 
these examples is framed in terms of an act being performed that falls outside the normative scope of consent.  It 
is also argued—unlike Dougherty's account (and unlike the 'graded voluntariness' account)—what the consentor 
would have decided, had she not been deceived, is not of direct normative relevance  ('Why Deception Does not 
Undermine Consent' (under review)). 
